




★industrial★ security

Society

VOL. 2, No. 2

APRIL 1958

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for
industrial security





GENERAL DYNAMICS
C O R P O R A T I O N

445 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 22, N.Y.



To Members of the American Society
for Industrial Security:

Recent events in outer space have once more reminded us that the measure of our work lies in what it contributes to the survival of our civilization. We must stay strong, and in staying strong preserve a way of life which is important to all mankind.

In this scheme of affairs, Industrial Security has an important role to play. Taking its cue from the broad problems which we face as a nation, it has a major service to render: the safeguarding of our industrial strength without interfering with its capacity to move forward at the rapid pace our times urgently require. This is a challenge worthy of the best in every sense of the word, and your achievements to date should be a proper source of pride to your organization.

Frank Pace Jr.

Frank Pace, Jr.
President

industrial security

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D. MILTON LADD

Named as Executive Director of ASIS



On February 1, 1958, D. Milton (Mickey) Ladd assumed his duties as full time Executive Director of ASIS at its Washington headquarters. The Society is indeed fortunate in having a man of his stature at the helm in Washington. He is a man of outstanding accomplishments and he brings to the Society a wealth of experience and prestige that will be a great asset to the ASIS.

D. MILTON LADD was born in Fargo, North Dakota, October 30, 1903, where he was educated in the public schools. In 1921 on graduation from high school, he accompanied his father to Washington, D. C., his father, formerly President of North Dakota Agricultural College, having been elected to the United States Senate to represent his state. In Washington, Mr. Ladd worked in his father's office and was clerk of the Public Lands Committee of the Senate while attending George Washington University night school. There he took three years of chemistry and then enrolled in law school from which school he graduated in 1928 with the LLB degree. The same year he was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar and also to practice before the United States Court of Appeals. In 1941 he was admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court. In 1952 he was awarded an honorary Doctor of Law degree by North Dakota Agricultural College. It was while working for his father on Capitol Hill that Mickey Ladd learned the operation of politics and established contacts, not only in the Senate and House, but in the various Government departments.

In 1928 Mr. Ladd was appointed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and later was placed in charge of the FBI offices in New Orleans, St. Louis,


St. Paul, Chicago, and Washington, D. C. In 1939 Mr. Ladd was promoted to Assistant Director in charge of the Identification Division and the Technical Laboratory. In 1941 just prior to Pearl Harbor, he was made Assistant Director of the Security Division where he was in charge of all espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and plant protection investigations. Also during this time he was a member of the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee, representing not only the FBI but the Department of Justice. He also served on the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Intelligence Advisory Committee, which committees coordinated the intelligence work of the entire Government and kept the President, Secretary of State, and other top Government leaders briefed on world affairs. In 1949 Mr. Ladd was again promoted to Assistant to the Director of the FBI, which position he held until he retired March 1, 1954. In this position he not only had charge of the Security work, but also all criminal investigations handled by all 52 field offices of the FBI. For the last 15 years he handled liaison work with Congress and the top officials in the other Government departments, testifying before Congressional committees, and representing the FBI on committees and conferences with the Attorney General, Secretary of State, and other top Government officials.

Mr. Ladd served as a consultant for George Washington University on research project "Population Migration" 1955-56; President of Foundation for American Research from 1955 to date; and Administrative Director of the Commission on Government Security from March 1956 to June 1957.

A Security Officer's **TOP SECRET WEAPON**

By JOHN W. WINSLOW,

*Manager, Security Department
Guided Missile Division
The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
Los Angeles, California*



All security directors, managers, and officers have tucked away somewhere in their everyday administration of industrial or military security, some form of individual technique which they claim to be of their own origin. The technique which I claim as my secret weapon is the display and use of the Holy Bible.

As one enters my office, the Bible is plainly visible between the book ends on my desk. I feel this is as great a tool for me in the field of everyday security as any military regulation or company policy in existence. There are many daily implications where God's word plays an important part in my security administration.

For example, an individual being received in my office as an applicant for employment, or a recent hire, or an old employee, who does not know me personally, immediately finds an old and trusted friend in his or her presence . . . the Bible. It provides them with a feeling of reassurance in themselves and in the people who administer our Government's security program.

A reverse situation to the above is likely to occur in a security officer's conference with a true atheist, a Communist, or a fellow traveler, by their taking exception to the presence of the Bible (and its teachings). If you find yourself somewhat in doubt concerning a person's political views or affiliations, you'll find a discussion on some scripture or lesson from the Bible quite enlightening.

Good and bad security may be found in many chapters of the Bible, and several of the following could be experienced by working personnel and security officers today:

The misguided trust Sampson placed in Delilah . . . equal to lack of security clearance. The inability of Christ to trust his apostles during his "night of agony" in Gethsemane, where each fell asleep . . . as might be the case of a guard on duty today. The denial of

Christ by Peter the night of his arrest . . . an example of how few can really be trusted when the chips are down. The parable of seeds sown upon the earth . . . certainly a lesson to security officers which points out how there can be exceptions in a multitude of people, no matter how carefully they are screened. Of course, there are many other parallel lessons too numerous to mention in a short article.

The Bible serves as a constant reminder to the security officer that he should consider each person as an individual with a distinct personality, rather than attempt to classify him in a general category. Experience has taught us that each security violation may be different and consideration should be given it according to the seriousness of the situation. Caution, however, in forgiveness of a violation of security procedure must be exercised the same in life today as in the Bible forgiveness cannot be granted unless the security officer fully understands the reason for the violation.

Some individuals have asked my interpretation of how they, as Christians, can be accomplices to the manufacture of such deadly weapons of war as those which we produce. The articles of war we make are not the articles of an aggressor. Further references from the Bible in the New Testament show an individual has rights and duties, under the laws of God, to protect his own home and the right ways of living as described in the teachings of Christ. Both moral and civil law permit the protection of that which is right and good. Both moral and civil law prohibit and condemn that which is evil and bad.

Looking to the future, it appears the common sense approach rests within the chapters of the world's yearly best seller . . . the Bible. The writings of men inspired by God in teaching of Christ have proved true in the past, and I feel sure the destiny of our nation's security rests in adhering to His words concerning the future.

The Origin and Evolution of the

"NEED-TO-KNOW" CONCEPT

The enemy produces completed intelligence data based upon an analysis of the information which has been acquired by one or more of the physical senses of his agents. One of the usual processes by which the enemy obtains this information is known as espionage, defined in Webster's Dictionary as: "an observation of the words and conduct of others." We counter this espionage by protecting the information with lock and key or by denying the enemy agents access to these areas where they could observe or overhear the information which we desire to protect. We also counter this espionage by limiting the dissemination of information which is of value to the enemy to those few individuals who have an actual need for the information in the performance of their duties. A limitation placed upon the number of individuals who know certain information restricts the number of individuals from whom the enemy may acquire such information. The security limitation on the dissemination of information to those personnel whose work requires that they have that information is known as the "need-to-know" concept.

This study traces the origin and the evolution of the "need-to-know" concept of the dissemination of information, as reflected in various publications of the United States Army. The development of the concept is traced from its origin in the "Articles of War," which prescribe the rules of conduct of the soldier, through the orders and correspondence by which the commander's troop dispositions and plans are transmitted, and through the security limitation classifications which are now placed upon certain types of information.

The "need-to-know" concept was originated to guard against those situations which prompted the birth of the Article of War prohibiting correspondence with the enemy. The fact that today's United States military forces have an identical Article would appear to indicate that the necessity for such a prohibition still remains valid.

The Articles of War of Richard II of England, written in 1385 A. D., probably contained the first formal written counter espionage rule. Item XIX thereof stated that "everyone shall guard . . . his said prisoner, that he may not ride about at large in the Army, nor suffer him to be at large in his quarters . . . lest he espy the secrets of the Army . . ." It remained

for King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden to recognize that some personnel might betray to the enemy important information which was entrusted to them. He included in his Code of Articles in 1621 A. D. that admonition which is the forerunner of Article 104 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, enacted by the United States Congress as recently as August 1956. The King's Article 70 stated: "Whoever, upon any strength, holds discourse with the enemy, more or less, without our leave, our generals, or the Governor of the place; shall die for it." And his Article 71 stated: "If it be proved that they have given the enemy any private intelligence, by letter or otherwise, without our leave as aforesaid; shall die for it." Three hundred and thirty-five years later, Article 104 of the American Uniform Code of Military Justice now states; "Any person who . . . without proper authority knowingly . . . gives intelligence to, or communicates or corresponds with or holds any intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct." The Articles of War which were written between 1621 and 1956 were refinements of those Articles originally written by King Gustavus Adolphus. Those Articles published up to 1806 which are pertinent to this study of the "need-to-know" concept are: Article VIII, Articles of War of James II (1688); Article XIX, British Articles of War (1765—in force at the start of the American Revolution, and which first used the words "corresponds either directly or indirectly"); Article 27th of the Massachusetts Articles of War (adopted by the Provisional Congress of Massachusetts Bay, April 5, 1775); Article XXVIII, American Articles of War of 1775 (enacted June 30, 1775); Article 19 of Section XIII of the American Articles of War of 1776 (enacted September 20, 1776); and Article 57 of the American Articles of War of 1806 (enacted April 10, 1806).

As an illustration of one type of implementation of the Articles of War, Article 57 of the Articles dated 1806 was cited as the basis for General Order No. 67 which General L. Thomas published for the War Department on August 26, 1861. This General Order stated that: "holding correspondence with or giving intelligence to the enemy, either directly or indirectly, is made punishable by death or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a Court

Martial. Public safety requires strict enforcement of this Article. It is therefore ordered that all correspondence and communication, verbally or by writing, printing or telegraphing, respecting operations of the Army or Military maneuvers on land or water, or respecting the troops, camps, arsenals, entrenchments, or military affairs within the several military districts, by which intelligence shall be, directly or indirectly, given to the enemy, without the authority and sanction of the General in command, be and the same are absolutely prohibited, and, from and after the date of this order persons violating the same will be proceeded against under the 57th Article of War."

The American Articles of War which were in force between 1806 and 1956 all contain an article with the same admonition against holding correspondence with or giving intelligence to the enemy, either directly or indirectly. These are: Number 46 of the Articles of War dated 1874 and Article 81 of the Articles of War, some of which were only partially amended, dated 1917, 1920, 1937, 1942 and 1948.

This discussion of the Articles of War has described why security limitations began and how they still remain in effect in the rules governing the conduct of the soldier. Subsequent discussion shows how these basic security rules were refined to pertain to orders, to correspondence, and to restrictive classifications.

Prior to the invention of that host of technical and scientific devices which comprise so many of the secrets of the Twentieth Century, the most important information to be withheld from the enemy was the disposition of forces, the plans of the commander for the utilization of his forces, and the orders by which the plans were to be implemented. In order to understand how the "need-to-know" concept developed, it is necessary to become familiar with some parts of the system of orders and regulations by which the Army was managed prior to 1921. The Commander's orders were usually disseminated in one of three ways: verbally to the commanders, by writing to the subordinates, and by means of the subordinates sending individuals to the Headquarters of the Commander for the purpose of copying the orders so that the copies could be carried to the command for dissemination. It was from the latter practice that the American Army today retains such terms as "Orderly Room" and "Officer's Orderly." The system of publishing Army Regulations was quite different during the period 1776-1921 from what it is today. Initially, the rules, regulations, tactics, technique, and the Articles of War—all the words which governed the conduct of the soldier in peace and in war—were published in one or two small books. An illustration of the protection given to the military information of a hundred years ago is Paragraph 488 of the "General Regulations for the Army," revised by General Winfield Scott, and the publication authorized by the Presi-

Acknowledgment

This treatise was written in the Office of Security Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel & Reserve), Office of the Secretary of Defense. Lt. Col. Robert B. Reppa, U.S. Army, did the research.

The American Society for Industrial Security expresses its appreciation to Mr. A. Tyler Port, Director of the Office of Security Policy, who granted permission to reprint it in "Industrial Security."

dent on 1 March 1825. Paragraph 488 stated that "Verbal Orders, addressed to officers, will be transmitted by officers, and preferably by staff officers. Written orders may be transmitted by orderlies. In this case the order would, in general, be sealed."

Pertinent to this study, and indicative of how information is protected by placing a limitation upon the number of individuals who are afforded the information, is the following extract from the Regulations of the Army which were published 1 May 1847: "*Article XLVI-Marches-Par. 683 . . .* Information touching the movements of troops, or dispositions of march, will not always be put in orders; and when it is not, it will be imparted to such persons only as it may concern. Nor is anyone to expect more to be communicated to him than is necessary for the complete execution of the service required of him." This was the earliest Army regulation located which contained the "need-to-know" concept as it is used today.

Instructions regarding the protection of the orders which are to be disseminated can be traced, with minor revisions and refinements, through the Army Regulations which became effective from 1 January 1857 until 1861. The Army Regulations published in 1861 contain three paragraphs which were to remain effective during the changes to the Regulations which were published in 1863, on 17 February 1881, 9 February 1889, 31 October 1895, 1 May 1901, 15 September 1904, and in 1908. These instructions stated that: "Paragraph 556. In the field, verbal orders and important sealed orders are carried by officers, and, if possible, by Staff Officers. When orders are in writing, the place and time of departure will be marked on them, and the place and time of delivery on the receipt." "Paragraph 557. Dispatches, particularly for distant corps, should be entrusted only to officers to whom their contents can be confided." And "Paragraph 495. Mounted soldiers are to be employed to carry dispatches only in special and urgent cases." The refinement wherein both the

(Continued on page 30)

Control of Closed Areas By Closed Circuit Television

By LEE F. MALONE, Corporate Security Director
The Burroughs Corporation, Detroit, Michigan



A year or so ago, the problem arose at the Burroughs Corporation as to how to cover a large "Closed Area" without establishing a twenty-four hour, seven-day-a-week guard post. We already had several of these and had no desire to add another. One such post was of particular interest because of its wide control of the plant communications system after regular working hours. This post controlled the City Fire Alarm Box, the night telephone system, and the public address system throughout the plant.

A question posed itself under the above circumstances. Would it be possible, during all down periods, to do without a guard assigned in the "Closed Area" if we brought the locked doors of the "Closed Area" to the guard stationed at the communications post by means of television cameras?

Three industrial television firms were invited to give demonstrations of their equipment. Also, a special agency of the Department of Defense, which has physical security cognizance of the area, was invited to send their physical security specialists to attend the demonstration.

The area to be controlled was a production floor area of a wing of one of our industrial plants. It was necessary to cover the main entrance to the area, which entrance was equipped with an electric lock; also the door to the fire exit stairwell, which was protected by a panic bar lock equipped with a plate glass obstruction behind the bar. The third perimeter opening to the "Closed Area" was a freight elevator door which was sealed closed by the use of box car seals. These doors are the only entrances to this "Closed Area A," housing the assembly of components which it is impossible to store appropriately during down periods. Within the physical confines of "Closed Area A" is "Closed Area B," which is of a higher designation of control responsibilities. This area has two entrances. One is the main entrance which is equipped with an electric lock, and the other is a fire exit door which is equipped with a panic type padlock installation on the inside of the door.

During the demonstration conference, which was attended by the security representatives invited, it was very apparent that the industrial television installation alone would not do the job. The writer

suggested the addition of open "mikes" in the area in conjunction with the television system. To get adequate coverage, the determination was made that it would be necessary to install one television camera which would cover both the main entrance to "Closed Area A" and the main entrance to "Closed Area B." A second television camera would be installed to cover the fire exit and the adjacent sealed elevator door to "Closed Area A." A third television camera would be installed to cover the fire exit to "Closed Area B." An open "mike" would be installed by the main entrance to "Closed Area A" and another by the main entrance to "Closed Area B." A third open "mike" would be installed between the fire exit and the freight elevator door to "Closed Area A." The purpose of the open "mikes" was to bring any noise of opening and closing of doors, or any other area noises, to the attention of the monitoring guard and insure his immediate and detailed observation of the television monitoring consoles.

The communications guard post would be equipped with three monitors so that the doors to the "Closed Area A" and "Closed Area B" would be constantly before him. This post would also be equipped with a speaker in order for the guard to be able to hear any area noises picked up by the open "mikes."

(Continued on page 34)

Monitoring station for closed circuit television system.



SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY

By JOSEPH J. LIEBLING

Assistant for Security to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, Headquarters, United States Air Force.



More and more people in our huge organizations—whether private or Government—are realizing that the magnitude of operations and the resulting divisions of responsibility are placing a tremendous burden on the "think power" of our management people. To complicate matters, the complexities and dispersal of these operations prohibit executives, managers, and supervisors from acting independently. The real significance then is the fact that we fully recognize our interdependence and are coordinating our efforts towards a common goal, international peace.

In this era of advanced air space technology, the atomic weapons field and ballistic missiles, the heretofore isolationist principle of self-preservation on the part of individual governments in the acquiescence to international agreements has become secondary to the absolute requirement for collective security of the free world. Such interdependence among allied nations from a political, economic standpoint has brought with it extremely complex problems.

In order to build an adequate defense among these nations, it is necessary to maintain current and continuous technological superiority through advanced research and development and production of the latest types of aircraft, missiles, and other equipments. This progress in itself is not enough, but at the same time we must deny hostile nations access to the critical data, performance characteristics, and techniques of design for these weapons, which they must have to keep abreast. These developments later reflect themselves in military operational use and, therefore, the gap must be widened to the point that the arsenal of military potential for ourselves and for our allied nations is in effect the deterrent for any aggression.

Here is where the difficult task of security comes into play. The widespread dissemination of data in our own country and on an international basis make an "airtight" security program both impossible and impracticable. Scientific groups and institutions require access to the data if we are to reap the bene-

JOSEPH J. LIEBLING

The Assistant for Security is responsible for administration, supervision, and coordination of security and intelligence matters pertaining to the USAF research and development and materiel fields on a domestic and international basis. Mr. Liebling was the first civilian authorized as a security review official for information intended for public release. He is the originator of the security classification directive applied to military technical developments. He is the Air Force authority for reviewing the security aspects involved in the international traffic in arms and export control, and for the program of increased sharing of information with our allies on research and development and production.

He attended Brooklyn College and the University of Maryland.

Mr. Liebling began his Government career in 1941 and since that time has worked in the fields of public relations, intelligence, security review, export control, and security policy on a domestic and international basis. He has received the Meritorious Civil Service Award in 1947 and in 1954; and the Superior Accomplishment Award in 1956. In 1956 he also received the Exceptional Civil Service Gold Medal Award which is the highest Air Force civilian decoration. Mr. Liebling is the recipient of the Arthur S. Flemming Award for 1957 as "one of the ten outstanding young men in the Federal Government."

He is a member of the Air Force Association and the American Society of International Law.

fits of their combined production effort. We must exchange information with other nations to assist them technologically. We must develop indigenous production capability abroad to enhance a stable economic foundation for those governments. In a totalitarian

(Continued on page 32)

"SELLING" SECURITY

HAROLD D. KNAPP

MANAGER,

SECURITY PLANS AND CONTROLS
DEFENSE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS
RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA



The safeguarding of classified projects is one of the most severe problems facing American industry engaged in defense work. The Department of Defense has spelled out for industrial contractors its requirements for security observance. The physical safeguards and proper procedures for handling classified materials are very clearly and carefully enumerated and explained in a Department of Defense document entitled "INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION." Complying with Department of Defense specific requirements is a relatively routine matter and involves such material safeguards as: putting the proper locks on the proper cabinets, assigning guards to restricted areas, receipting for classified materials as directed, etc.—but—real security is not that simple. To preserve America's technological lead time, to keep the scientific advantages that we have, to prevent our enemies from knowing what we are doing the moment we are doing it, requires an awareness, an alertness on the part of individuals. This cannot be acquired by requisition or purchase of the required material safeguards.

The *individual* is the key to effective security—and yet, it is this person, generally speaking, who has been most neglected in both industrial and military security programming. He has been neglected because the stringent requirements of security are most frequently dictated to him and are usually in conflict with his American heritage of freedom of thought, effort and exchange of information. He has been neglected because he has not been "sold" on the need for security—rather, he has been "told." He has been neglected because the only incentive offered for his complete cooperation has been a negative one. Specifically, he is constantly quoted to from the Espionage Act of 1938 and informed of his personal liability should he be responsible for a violation or compromise.

The employee of a defense contractor, this key to effective security, must first understand the need for abiding by security regulations; secondly, must be made sympathetic to the need; thirdly, must, of his own volition, have the desire to cooperate.

This makes an intangible of the security problem

which cannot be solved by writing rules and regulations or putting locks on safes and doors. The solution of this problem, industry-wide, requires a "selling" job—one that will educate and inspire the employee to act willingly and diligently regarding security procedures.


At RCA, we are making an all-out drive to "sell" security to every employee. Borrowing from the past valuable experiences of branches of the military services and industrial defense partners, RCA has developed a "Security Awareness Program," designed to make RCA employees *want* to abide by the security restrictions placed upon them. Our effort is not directed towards spies and saboteurs, but rather towards carelessness and indifference to security procedures.

There are approximately fourteen thousand people at RCA connected with Department of Defense projects. These people are located in seven plants and laboratories throughout the country.

The program was initiated by a series of personalized lectures given to all personnel involved in defense work. These lectures have been given to groups of from twenty to two thousand people, depending upon the locations and physical capacity available for assembling people. In realistic language and form, this lecture-presentation brings security down-to-earth and explains to the employee, in simplified terms, what our country and our company are "buying" with security.

In order to remove the stigma of "witch hunt" and the frequently antagonistic attitude towards security, we purposely stayed away from quotations of the Espionage laws or the telling of spy stories. We do not want to create an atmosphere of mutual suspicion among our employees—the feeling that everybody is a spy leaning over their shoulders. We strongly point out that *carelessness* and *indifference* are the main culprits involved in security malpractices. To emphasize this point, we created an innocuous, fictitious characterization to personify this carelessness and indifference. This gremlin-like character was first introduced in our presentations on slides. He was de-

(Continued on page 42)



one headache you don't need!

(fringe benefits for your guard force)

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Administration of Security In Industry

BY ARTHUR C. LINK, COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER
WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INCORPORATED

We at the Western Electric Company consider our security obligations very seriously. We have organized to meet our solemn obligation to the Nation by insuring proper indoctrination of all employees involved in Government work, to keep it ever before them, and to check results by an adequate system of inspection routines.

At our headquarters in New York we have long had a Security Organization which supplies guidance to an appointed key security man at each Company location. Periodic meetings are held to assure that our security program is up to date.

To many people, the word "security" in the past has meant plant protection—patrolman and fences to safeguard property, whereas it now encompasses a much broader definition to thousands of Western Electric people.

They are the men and women who work at more than one hundred different company locations across the country on such projects as the Distant Early Warning Line of radar stations, Nike guided missile systems, and other classified projects.

The responsibility for safeguarding classified material is shared alike by the Western Electric employee and management. Employees, of course, are personally responsible for the material to which they have access. The Company, on the other hand, goes to great lengths to help the individual employee play it safe by furnishing all the physical accoutrements of keeping a secret. These include cabinets, safes, classified waste containers, fencing and other barriers, guards, patrol services, and alarm systems. When adequate protection cannot be afforded in any other way, seg-



Arthur C. Link, Security Officer of the Western Electric Company since November 1953, has had an extensive background in this important function.

Born and raised in Chicago, Mr. Link attended the Lewis Institute there (now part of Illinois Institute of Technology) and Northwestern University. He joined the Western Electric Company at Chicago in 1911 where he handled drafting and engineering activities in connection with special telephone apparatus. He left during World War I to serve with the U.S. Army in France. After serving in various posts of responsibility at Western Electric's vast Chicago plant from 1918 to 1948 where he rose to the ranks of Works Comptroller and Assistant Works Manager, Mr. Link moved in 1948 to the New York headquarters of the Company as an Administrative Officer. Here he became Director of Organizational Planning and conducted studies of Western's vast and complete structure.

During the past five years, as Company Security Officer, Mr. Link has instituted, coordinated, and administered a nation-wide security program.

Mr. Link is a member of the American Ordnance Association, the Railroad-Machinery Club of N. Y., the Larchmont (N. Y.) Yacht Club, The New York Chamber of Commerce, and the American Rocket Society. With his wife Marcia he lives in Larchmont, N. Y.

gregated areas are set aside for the performance of classified work.


In accordance with local instructions, each Division of the Company conducts security inspections to keep all personnel alert. Teams of employees in each working group are trained to carry out after-hour spot inspections of safes, files, desk tops, and even desk drawers to make sure that classified material is properly secured. The Company Security Organization conducts security surveys on a periodic basis at all locations handling classified information. Such surveys assist the local management in clearing up any problems and assuring the maintenance of an effective security program.

We should indeed be shortsighted if we did not realize that our position as a Company engaged in important defense work makes us a prime target for espionage effort. It follows that those of us who work here are targets also.

For example, personnel working on the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line were targets of a steady stream of propaganda broadcast by a female disk jockey reminiscent of the nefarious World War II spellbinder Tokyo Rose. Dubbed Moscow Molly, she became a favorite of a wide Arctic audience. One employee reported that Molly often made specific remarks about people or incidents along the Line—aimed at the demoralization of civilians and military personnel in the North. She accurately listed items arriving on incoming planes and sometimes told workers subtle details of family life at home.

Incidents such as these, while not resulting in compromise, indicate the desire and ability of a potential enemy to penetrate within our

(Continued on page 38)




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Loyalty-Security PARALLELS IN HISTORY

By JOHN G. CONNELL, JR.
Assistant for Security & Personnel
Office of the Administrative Assistant
Office, Secretary of The Army



The problems of subversion and security have commanded a great deal of our attention during the past few years. Many prominent citizens and citizen groups have voiced opinions, alarms, and condemnations concerning the handling of these problems by the executive and legislative branches of our national Government.

The problems themselves are not new. Each major crisis in our national history has involved similar problems. During the Revolution, George Washington had to cope with internal subversion and espionage with little or no machinery for effectively dealing with the situation. The Civil War period saw an even more bitter struggle to maintain the integrity of our Federal Government. The emotional atmosphere prevailing during that period prompted the development and application of some of the most arbitrary devices imaginable for testing the loyalty of citizens to the Government.

Our current preoccupation with the threat to our governmental system and institutions posed by Communism deals with one fundamental difference. That is, while our previous security problems have involved primarily the attempt to thwart our realization of independence, division from within, or the threat against our freedom, we are now fighting an international conspiracy to overturn not only the governmental institutions of this country, but those of all other countries governed under a non-communist system. Further, the problem is broadened today by the fact that present subversive efforts are highly organized, better financed, and are based to a large extent upon a psychointellectual appeal designed to transcend national loyalties. True, Moscow is the mecca of all Communists, but they see the USSR as an instrument rather than an end in their goal to realize the "rewards" of proletarian rule.

However, in order to get our present concern with the internal protection of national security into better perspective, it might be interesting to review some of the security problems in our history and how our forebears dealt with them.

Our fledgling Continental Army in 1776 had many
(Continued on page 35)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JOHN G. CONNELL, JR.

Born in Atlanta, Georgia, September 26, 1914, where he attended elementary and high school. Graduated from Tech High School 1933. Entered Government service in 1935 at U. S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D. C. Was Assistant Chief of Appointments Section, Personnel Division, U. S. Housing Authority from 1939 to 1940. Transferred to Office, Secretary of War in December 1940 as a Liaison Representative of Civilian Personnel Division. Became Personnel Manager, Office, Secretary of War in July 1942. Entered Army as Private May 1943; attended Air Force OCS, Miami Beach, and commissioned 2nd Lt. 1 April 1944; transferred from Air Force to OSS in July 1945; released from active duty January 1946 and returned to position as Personnel Manager. Attended George Washington University night school 1938 to 1941 to 1946 to 1952. Received AA Degree from George Washington University 1948 graduating from that University with BA Degree in Government on 28 May 1952.

In addition to the position of Personnel Manager for the Office, Secretary of the Army, he has also served, concurrently, in the following capacities in the Department of the Army:

*Chairman, Army Security Screening Board.
Member, Army Board for Correction of Military Records.
Vice-Chairman, Department of Army Blood Donor Program
Member, Board of Directors, Department of Army Welfare Fund
Member, Advisory Committee on Civilian Awards
Member, Performance Rating Committee.*

He now lives with his wife and two daughters, ages 5 and 9 years, in Alexandria, Virginia.

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Kidde engineer points to inconspicuous Ultrasonic transmitter.

'Silent Sound' Insures Burglar-Proof Three- Dimensional Protection

Using sound waves too high to be heard by the human ear, the Kidde Ultrasonic Burglar Alarm System saturates the entire protected area, wall to wall, floor to ceiling, with a network of 'silent sound' waves that penetrate every cubic inch of space. Any attempt to enter disturbs the wave pattern, instantly triggers an alarm! Even a lock-in doesn't stand a chance, because once the system is turned on, his first move betrays him.

What's more, the unbeatable Kidde system cannot be bypassed or sabotaged without giving an alarm. It can be easily carried by one man and plugs into any standard electrical outlet.

When installed in accordance with regulations of Underwriters' Laboratories the system qualifies for certification. For more information, send today for Kidde's Ultrasonic Alarm Booklet.

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Designed specifically for low-cost, efficient protection of out-of-door areas and large indoor spaces, the tamper-proof Kidde Photo-Electric Burglar Alarm System projects an invisible beam of 'black light' over an effective range of 900 feet. Through mirrors the beam can be "bent" up to 90°. Any interruption of the 'black light' beam, or any attempt to bypass the system with another light beam disturbs the frequency modulated waves and instantly sounds the alarm.



Security Chief checks alignment of Photo-Electric projector.

The entire system consists of a projector (shown above) and a receiver, each about 10½" long and 6½" in diameter, neither requiring any special wiring. Transistors conserve space, lengthen equipment life, eliminate tube replacement problems. Approved by Underwriters' Laboratories. Ideal for proprietary systems, the Kidde Photo-Electric Burglar Alarm System gives the best long distance protection at the lowest possible cost. Write today for Kidde's Photo-Electric Burglar Alarm System booklet.

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A Film— “SECURITY IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY”

BY RICHARD J. HEALY

assistant director of industrial relations for security
The Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation

DURING FILMING—Harry Bumble (Eugene Knight, Jr.), fictional young engineer, is shown seated at his desk for a scene in the award-winning Ramo-Wooldridge “Security Is Your Responsibility” motion picture. Standing next to the desk is cameraman Glenn Dodge, with Jack Smith, production supervisor, behind the camera.

The annual “Oscar” awards presented in Hollywood accrue international attention for the film city and its motion pictures.

Lesser known are the annual awards presented by the Industry Film Producers Association.

Top industrial film honors were recently bestowed by the latter organization on The Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation's security indoctrination film, “Security Is Your Responsibility,” when the film won a First Award plaque in the IFPA annual competition.

Naturally, I was pleased that a film with which I had been associated from the beginning as technical adviser had won top film honors. My previous background in motion picture production had been only as a spectator.

Just what is behind the preparation and filming of an award winning industrial motion picture?

Let's go back a little—

In 1955, we in the security department at Ramo-Wooldridge were in the process of developing a com-

plete security program to appeal to intelligent, analytical thinking scientists working on some of the most sensitive research projects in the country. As a part of this program it was felt that a motion picture might be of value in the security education of the scientists.

We enlisted the services of our public relations department with whom we have always worked closely, and outlined our project requirement.

The public relations attitude was projected into our initial meeting.

Although we personally were interested in security programs, we realized that many people regard industrial security as a dull, dry subject, and if a film were to be produced it would have to have a new, fresh, interesting, entertaining and attention-getting approach to be successful.

The theme of most security films produced in the past had evolved around the spy, the patriotic ap-

(Continued on page 41)



FILM AWARD PRESENTATION—Richard J. Healy, assistant director of industrial relations for security accepts the Industry Film Producers Association award plaque from Warner Brothers actress Joanne Barnes, on behalf of The Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation. “Security Is Your Responsibility,” The Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation's security indoctrination film, won First Award honors in the annual IFPA competition.

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, APRIL, 1958

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"Top secret defense material shall be protected in storage by the most secure facilities possible."

They also comply with the security policy outlined in General Services Administration Bulletin No. 170, dated June 27, 1955.

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FOUR-DRAWER NON-INSULATED SECURITY CABINET

The new NON-INSULATED cabinets are another Herring-Hall-Marvin FIRST. They are specially designed for the protection of classified materials in areas where fire is not a primary hazard and where floor loading is a problem. They are sturdily constructed of heavy materials. These cabinets are certified by the Standards Division of the General Services Administration to comply with the test requirements of Interim Federal Specifications AA-F-00358a (GSA-FSS) dated February 11, 1957, for a Class 3 Cabinet.

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Western Regional Activities

BY THOMAS J. O'NEILL

Security Officer, Stanford Research Institute
and Western Regional Coordinator of
Information, ASIS.



"Look West, young man, for ASIS leadership in 1958" might well be the slogan of members in the Western Region, as indicated by the following activities: two new chapters have already been formed this year; plans for at least four more chapters are being made; the existing chapters are all mapping vigorous programs for the year; and plans for the 1959 convention to be held at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, September 21-23, 1959, are being made by an enthusiastic Southern California group.

The two new chapters, San Diego and Arizona, were granted charters in January. Efforts to form the Arizona chapter were spearheaded by John McCauley of the General Electric Computer Department in Phoenix, while the San Diego effort was headed by George Higgins of Convair at San Diego. Both chapters have now elected officers and are making plans for attractive programs to include a material expansion of members during the coming year.

Four additional chapters are in formative stages at Santa Barbara, Ogden, Sacramento, and Seattle. Petition signatures are now being collected by Donald Gearhart at General Electric, TEMPO in Santa Barbara; by David Troupe at Marquardt Aviation in Ogden; and by Raymond Grady at Aerojet-General in Sacramento. Glenn Dierst of the Boeing Airplane Company is actively soliciting support for a chapter in Seattle.

The 1959 convention at the Los Angeles Ambassador Hotel is expected to be an exceptional affair. Outstanding facilities are being made available to include the internationally known Cocoanut Grove for the convention banquet, complete with orchestra and the floor show which will be currently playing there. The Cocoanut Grove always features a top orchestra and entertainment. However, the 1959 convention banquet will be but one feature to look forward to at the Los Angeles convention/seminar, according to the predictions of the Southern California chapter members.

Both the Northern California chapter, led by Bert Inman, Westinghouse, and the Southern California

chapter, led by George Thomson, North American Aviation, are planning outstanding seminars to take place in May. The Southern California chapter on May 14 at the Ambassador Hotel is having a half-day seminar and dinner meeting at which they expect to have a nationally known figure as the dinner speaker. Plans are being made to accommodate as many as 400 members and guests for the dinner because each member of the Southern California chapter is expected to bring at least one member of his top management. A large number of additional guests is being invited. The Northern California chapter is making plans for a two-day seminar in May at the Villa Hotel in San Mateo, with Government representatives from the Department of Defense in Washington participating in the program. A large attendance is expected.

Considerable enthusiasm has been indicated by the attendance at the chapter meetings held to date this year. For example, the Southern California chapter had 124 in attendance at their January 16 dinner meeting at the Chapman Park Hotel in Los Angeles. The Northern California chapter had 63 present at a dinner meeting held at Treasure Island in San Francisco on February 18. Both the San Diego and Arizona chapters have now had their organizational meetings and are planning to expand their activities.

Because of the amount of activity in the region, Regional Vice-President Richard J. Healy recently announced the appointment of three members in the region to assist in the more active areas. Robert Dennis, System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California, has agreed to serve as coordinator of regional membership activities. Paul Crews, Northrop Aviation, Hawthorne, California, has assumed the responsibility for the coordination of placement in the region, and Thomas J. O'Neill, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, is acting as Regional Coordinator of Information. In a letter to all members in the region, it was announced by Vice-President Healy that each of the three appointees would act in a liaison capacity between the national headquarters and chapters in the region and would coordinate chapter activities within the region.

Under Healy's dynamic leadership, the Western Region of ASIS plans to have more chapters, more members, more everything when we descend on Washington for the 1958 national convention! Again we say, "Look West, young man."

Chapter Activities



TOP ROW LEFT: Chairman Bert D. Inman of Westinghouse opens meeting of Northern California Chapter;
MIDDLE ROW LEFT: At the January 16 Southern California chapter meeting, George Higgins shows Dick Healy
the signed petition requesting a charter for the San Diego chapter.

BOTTOM ROW LEFT: Don D. Darling (pen in hand), Security Chief, ARDC, gives information to a group at the
Southern California meeting.

TOP ROW RIGHT: Joyce Traynor, Stanford Research Institute, goes over notes of Northern California Chapter
meeting with Chairman Bert D. Inman, Westinghouse, and LCDR Ray Nieman and Lt. Col. Clem Slattery, the latter
two from the Fort Holabird Faculty.

MIDDLE ROW RIGHT: Along with the 124 members and guests attending the January 16 meeting of the Southern
California chapter at the Chapman Park Hotel in Los Angeles were: L. to R., Bert Inman, Chairman of the Northern California
chapter; Richard Healy, Western Regional Vice-President; John Buckley, 2nd Vice-President and Member of
the Board of Directors, George Thomson, Chairman, Southern California chapter; and Ross Miller, Member of the
Board of Directors.

BOTTOM ROW RIGHT: George Thomson, Chairman, Southern California chapter, welcomes the 124 members and
guests to the dinner meeting held on January 16 at the Chapman Park Hotel in Los Angeles.

MORE CHAPTER PICTURES APPEAR ON FOLLOWING PAGE.



Top left: George Thomson, Chairman, Southern California Chapter, right, and Ross Miller, left, members of the Board of Directors, standing in front of one of the Palms in the Cocoanut Grove, Ambassador Hotel, invite you to attend the Convention September 21-23, 1959.

Bottom left: Members present at a recent Pittsburgh Chapter meeting.

Reading right column top to bottom: Officers and members of Arizona Chapter of ASIS; (l. to r.), Floyd J. Rondeau, Security Officer, Arizona Public Service; Carl Pryor, Security Supervisor, Sperry Phoenix Company; Fred W. Ömnus, Supt. Security Dept. Reynolds Metals Company, ASIS Chairman; M. H. Curry, Security Officer, AiResearch Mfg. Co. of Arizona, ASIS Secretary; John F. McCauley, Specialist, Security & Safety, General Electric Co., ASIS Vice-Chairman; Carl J. Nelson, Vernon Tool Company of Arizona; Al G. King, Phoenix Engineering & Mfg. Company, ASIS Treasurer; G. K. Teffeu, Engineering Coordinator, AiResearch Mfg. Co. of Arizona.

Officers & Members of Newly-Formed San Diego Chapter of ASIS, L. to R., Front Row: Frank G. Merritt, Convair, San Diego, Chief of Industrial Security; Frank X. Burkhouse, Convair-Astronautics, Security Officer; George D. Higgins, Jr., Convair Corporate Director of Industrial Security, Chairman; Leslie E. Gehrea, Ryan Aeronautical Company, Manager of Employee Relations, Vice Chairman; Richard J. Healy, Ramo-Woodridge Corporation, Security Manager, ASIS Vice President, Western Region; L. to R., Back Row: Steve B. Dudley, BAR-San Diego, Security Specialist; Robert W. Rayburn, AFPR-San Diego, Security Officer; Stuart F. Brown; John T. Iles, General Atomic, Security Officer; Frank L. Cook, Convair-Astronautics, Security Officer; Rush G. Glick, Convair-San Diego, Supervisor of Security & Investigation, Treasurer; Jay R. Colvin, AFPR-San Diego, Chief Security Division, Secretary; William E. Bowman, Convair-Astronautics, Chief of Industrial Security.

Detroit Chapter meeting, L. to R., John Sutherland, Treasurer; John Johnson; Lee F. Malone, Chairman; Eugene B. Kelly, Secretary; and Joseph Keeley, Vice Chairman.

L. to R.: Everett W. Smith, John P. Johnson Charles Mitchell, Al Langleis, Paul Clark, Clayton Van Auken of the Detroit Chapter.



*when
silence
means ...*

SECURITY



A careless word, a thoughtless hint, may cause incalculable trouble for your country and your company. Most people would resent it bitterly if they were accused of disloyalty. Yet their indiscretion may do more harm than a

dozen saboteurs. Don't talk about what you see, hear or do at your work. Don't give a listener anything to carry with him. This is the essence of RCA's security program. "Security Sense is Common Sense."



RADIO CORPORATION of AMERICA

DEFENSE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS
CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY



Department of Defense **Industrial Security**

By LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANKLIN E. JORDAN, M.I., USAR

On a nearly monthly basis for the past two years specially cleared and selected representatives of Government and industry from all sections of the United States have been taking planes, trains, buses, or private autos to Baltimore, Maryland.

On arrival at this busy seaport on Chesapeake Bay, these men and women, some of them officers and others civilians, are guided to the industrial flats of Southeast Baltimore, some five miles from its center, where the Department of the Army's Fort Holabird is located. This location is an appropriate one for the two industrial security courses of the Department of Defense as Fort Holabird is surrounded by industry. There is a yeast factory to the South; a soap factory to the West; a jelly and jam factory to the North, and the World's largest tidewater steel plant to the East. Inside the fort itself are the huge buildings that once housed a brewery.

As generally scheduled, the Department of Defense Industrial Security Orientation Course is given the first three weeks of the month. This course is primarily for Government representatives—cognizant officers, field inspectors and their associates—who not only want to know the what and why of the program but its operational aspects of who and how; where

and when. The Industrial Security Management Course is one week. It is primarily for security officers and their associates of private industry, although other levels of management are welcomed. This course stresses the what and why of the industrial security program since management is not concerned with the administrative details of Government agencies. Up to 1958, almost 1,000 Government representatives and nearly 700 management representatives had graduated from the courses.

Government representatives, who are for the most part officers of the Armed Forces, are quartered on the post in renovated World War II barracks. Management representatives usually make the Lord Baltimore Hotel, in midtown, their residence. They are taken to and from the post each day by bus.

Both groups, however, open their courses with a breakfast at the Fort Holabird Officers' Open Mess where they are welcomed by the Commanding General of the Post and then given their initial orientation. Service personnel are told to be sure they have enough copies of their orders, and Government civilians are reminded that their courtesy post exchange privileges do not include cigarettes. For their non-school hours, students are reminded of Baltimore's

(Continued on page 24)

Defense Security Courses

M.I., USAR

PHOTOGRAPHS TOP OF PAGE READING
LEFT TO RIGHT.

Initial view of Fort Holabird from the Industrial Security students' bus as it approaches Gate 13—main entrance to the post which was established during World War I.

Over the breakfast coffee cups at the Fort Holabird Officers' Open Mess, students are welcomed by Major General Richard G. Prather, Post Commander and Commandant of its school, and Colonel Thomas M. Larner, Assistant Commandant.

Highlight of the courses is the pre-graduation banquet addressed by some outstanding figure in the field of security. Here Colonel Sidney S. Rubenstein, USAF, of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, describes some of the problems of declassification of documents to an Industrial Security Management class.

The Armed Forces Team—Army, Navy, Air Force and their close associate, the FBI, are all represented at the banquet. Left to Right are Major General Richard G. Prather, Rear Admiral Robert B. Goldman (Ret.), Mr. James J. Kelly of the FBI, Colonel Sidney S. Rubenstein of the Air Force, and Colonel Thomas M. Larner, Assistant Commandant of Fort Holabird's schools.



Regular classroom lectures also are varied by informal and formal panel discussions climaxed by this top level policy panel from DOD. This panel, held at the close of each course, encourages questions and comments by the students.



More formal classroom lectures and conferences are interspersed with trips to the DOD Central Index Files and to classrooms of the Technical Subjects Branch where cutaway training aids illustrate the basic principles of locking devices required for security protection.

Industrial Security Courses (Continued)

historical and cultural attractions from Fort McHenry, birthplace of the Star Spangled Banner, to the grave of the poet, Edgar Allen Poe. Students also are reminded there is no security for their reputations or pocketbooks if they visit Baltimore's BBB Block of bars, burlesque, and bruisers.

Following orientation, students assemble in a modern three-story school building where the Army, as the operational agency for the Department of Defense, has set aside a special classroom for these industrial security courses and equipped it with a generous supply of visual and audio training aids. Here their instructors, which include representatives of all three military departments, and numerous guest lecturers present more than half a hundred different phases of the program in fifty-minute sessions with ten-minute smoke breaks and a midmorning and mid-afternoon coffee break between. The normal schedule is from eight o'clock in the morning until quarter of twelve, and from one o'clock in the afternoon until quarter of five.

Classroom sessions are interspersed with trips to the DOD Central Index Files of Fort Holabird, which students will later use, and to the Martin-Baltimore plant at Middle River, Maryland, to see industrial security in action.

Other activities include skits in the Auditorium, demonstrations in the Technical Subjects Branch, seminars, and practical problems.

Unless unusual circumstances intervene, students are usually oriented on the role of the Department of Defense in Industrial Security by Mr. Robert L. Applegate of the Office of Security Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel and Reserve, who has been intimately connected with the program since the Munitions Board first looked into the problem in 1947.

From his personal experience, Mr. Applegate describes the problems of getting out the first little fifteen-page industrial security regulation by DOD, appropriately known as the Gray Book, and published in 1950. He explains the interservice problems that nearly ended the program before the final approval by the Munitions Board in 1953. Finally, he shows how the current DOD courses evolved, starting with the Industrial Security Orientation Course in February 1955 and the Management Course added in May 1956.

This leads into a chart-illustrated explanation of the organization of the Department of Defense to handle industrial security and the procedures by which it delegates area jurisdiction and cognizant authority through the military departments, showing the individual operational differences from the Army's centralized control to the Air Force's decentralized system. Lively student discussion reveals the importance of this instruction. Government representatives

usually find the instruction on business organizations and their security services are especially enlightening, while management representatives get an understanding of security organizations of the military services.

Without an understanding of the laws, executive orders, and regulations on which the industrial security program is based, many procedures have little significance. An important part of the course is consideration of the Espionage, Sabotage, Immigration and Naturalization Acts; Executive Orders 10104 and 10501, and the security regulations of the Department of Defense and the several military departments applicable to industrial security, particularly the AFISR or Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation on which the Industrial Security Manual, that is part of the Government-Industry Security Agreement, is based.


Both courses make clear why industrial security is so vital. The realities of espionage, sabotage, and enemy subversion in our every-day lives are shown and, more frequently than not, the instructor's comments are substantiated by the experiences of students who may be retired admirals, generals, deans of colleges, or others high up in management levels. Current problems are supplemented by instruction in future planning for emergencies or disasters.

The tangible aspects of physical security provide a welcome contrast to the essential but intangible guidance on reports and report procedures. Classes engage in lively discussions such as what kind of a fence is a good fence or are both passes and badges necessary. Repeatedly stressed is the high cost of physical security and the importance of keeping costly recommendations consistent with the degree of risk involved. An example: the establishment of one additional 24 hour guard post is estimated to cost \$25,000.

In addition to theory and background instruction, the courses provide some very practical help for the students such as techniques of finger printing, how to change the combination on a lock, or time-savers in filling out various reports.

Clearance procedures for both facilities and personnel occupy a large portion of the instructional hours. Management students learn the reasons for requirements and come to realize the importance of cooperation. Government representatives are given not only the reasons for the procedures, but the details of operation to illustrate Department of Defense policy in the implementation of various regulations. The Office of Industrial Personnel Security Review with its screening, hearing, and review boards that protect the rights of an individual as well as the Government are fully explained, including the use of the 22 established criteria for determination standards. Complex problems such as how to determine foreign influence in a complicated facility structure are discussed.

(Continued on page 26)



MAXIMUM PHYSICAL SECURITY!

Only **BEST** Locks Give You This
Instant Lock Change Feature!

- Only Best Universal Locks with the patented "Interchangeable Core" let you change one lock or entire groups of locks in mere seconds! Economical, too. Individual lock combinations can be changed, letting you re-use Best locks indefinitely instead of buying new locks or hardware whenever lock changes are needed.

SIMPLIFIED MASTERKEYING—All types of Best locks can be masterkeyed into one simplified, easy-to-manage system. Time-tested by more than 30 years use, Best locks are specified *exclusively* by many of the nation's largest industries and defense installations.

Learn how easily you can change over to a Best Locking System. Write today for "How 13,000 Best Universal Locks Paid for Themselves in Two Years" for one of the nation's

leading industries. We will gladly include descriptive literature and the name of your nearest regional Best Lock Representative.

ILLUSTRATION ABOVE SHOWS

the "Interchangeable Core," containing precision pin-tumbler lock, removed by Security Officer with special "Control Key" (used only to remove and replace cores). Lock can be locked or unlocked with regular operating key, but cannot be removed or changed except by Security Officer's control key. Pin-tumblers in lock mechanism can be changed (recombined) allowing core to be used over again as a new lock.



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"Security At Its Best"

Industrial Security Courses (Continued)

Particular attention is paid to plant visitors who have been divided into twelve categories for clearance purposes, but who still pose problems by refusing to remain neatly definable within the categories. Class discussions become animated as such questions as handling vending machine operators, service men, or transferred consultants are discussed.

Classified document procedures occupy another sizable block of instruction. Problems of storage, particularly classified devices and materials, self-generated documents, reproduction, transfer, retirement, and destruction are covered. The importance to industry, from both a time and expense standpoint, of insuring that the least possible amount of classified material is involved in a contract and that what is classified avoids blanket classifications, is shown and, specifically, the system for breaking the contract down into its smallest possible component parts and assigning the lowest possible classification to each. Of equal interest, are discussions of procedures for downgrading and declassifying material as fast as possible.

Finally, the importance of continual security education is brought out and, above all, the fact that industrial security will only be as effective as the belief of management and employees in its importance. As a practical assist, students learn how to secure films for group instruction, wall posters, pamphlets, and editorial cartoons and stories for their company publications.

These are the highlights but the real teaching which makes the lessons stick is done through the modern technique of class participation at every opportunity. In addition to the three Army instructors, the other military departments are represented by Lt. Col. Clement G. Slattery, U. S. Air Force (Ret.), and Lt. Cmdr Ray C. Nieman, USNR.

The Industrial Security Management Course was less than six months old when the American Society for Industrial Security held its Second Annual Seminar in Washington, D. C. in 1956. The enthusiastic comments heard at that seminar indicated clearly that every graduate was an enthusiastic booster for the course, and felt that the Department of Defense was performing an extremely important service to industry. Defense officials, on the other hand, felt that through these students Industry was giving Defense a much better understanding of its problems. A leader in advocating the importance of this mutual understanding was Captain Eric L. Barr Jr. (USN, Ret.), Security Director of the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation, an officer of the American Society for Industrial Security, and one of the first graduates of the Industrial Security Management Course.

Perhaps the success of the courses may result from the premise on which they are operated as expressed

by Major A. H. Wagener, Chief of the Industrial Security Section of the school at Fort Holabird: "Security is a common sense proposition. If by our industrial skill, we have a lead time over our enemies of from six months to a year, a security system that slows down production for six months or a year obviously cancels out all our advantage. One hundred percent security is zero production. Once we take classified materials out of their secure containers we are running a calculated risk. How much risk is justified is the eternally unresolved problem. We must never forget that all security measures are not an end in themselves but merely the means to achieving protection of our nation. It is the purpose of these courses to provide a means of mutual understanding so that Government and industry will work as one team in providing for the common security of the entire nation."

ABOUT THE AUTHOR—

Lt. Colonel Jordan is a graduate of the Industrial Security Orientation Course at Fort Holabird. His introduction to industrial security was at the Army's Ordnance Research Center at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland during World War II, where he served as chief of counter-intelligence investigations and, later, as executive officer of the Security and Intelligence Division. His work included directing all types of investigations as well as supervising fire, police, safety, traffic, and visitor control units.

Lt. Colonel Jordan has just returned to civilian life after completing 13 years of military service. His last assignment was for two years as Chief of the Test & Experimentation Division of the U. S. Army Intelligence Board, and prior to that a two-and-a-half year assignment as Officer-in-Charge of the research and writing of a 30 volume manuscript history of the Counter Intelligence Corps from its inception in World War I to the Korean Conflict.

For 15 years of his civilian career, Lt. Colonel Jordan was a newspaperman, starting on the Boston (Mass.) Post. During the thirties, he was Aviation and Military Editor of the famed Boston Evening Transcript and, in the early forties, Managing Editor of the Portsmouth (N. H.) Herald. He has been editor of a number of specialized and trade magazines and, in his spare time for a number of years, was an instructor in Publicity at Boston University's College of Business Administration.



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FACTS ABOUT PEOPLE

THE FACTS: The mushroom on the right is the edible Amanita Rubescens (The Blusher).

At left is the deadly Amanita Muscaria (Fly Amanita).





Suite 317

We were sorry to hear of the recent illness of our Northeast Regional Vice President, Jim Soutter. All the members in that region certainly miss the enthusiasm which he has constantly shown in ASIS. Our best wishes for a speedy recovery, Jim, and we are all looking forward to your being back with us soon. Mr. Soutter's duties are being handled by our ardent member, Ernie Felago, who has always been one of our most driving forces in the New York area.

Doctors have also curtailed the activities of two of our staunch supporters in the Southeast, namely, our Southeast Regional Vice President, Major Chester Allen and his co-worker Captain Hugo Sanford. We understand they are recuperating but must take life at an easier pace in the future.

Jack Buckley is planning another big meeting to be held in April or May to be sponsored by the Northern California Chapter. All of you who attended last year will remember what a success that one was. If you happen to be in the California area during the time of this meeting I would suggest you attend since from all report Jack puts on something that equals one of our conventions.

With regard to conventions, Harry Crow, the 1958 Convention chairman, has formulated the plans for a two-day Seminar at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington on September 16 and 17.

John Marrett, one of our ASIS members with The Trans-Canada Telephone System in Montreal, Canada, advised me he is now Secretary of the sister organization of ASIS in Canada. Their society is known as Industrial Security Association of Canada (ISAC). They have published their brochure setting forth their aims and objectives and would appreciate any ideas from ASIS members to further their cause in Canada. We extend our best wishes, John, for your very worthwhile cause and please keep us posted on your progress.

The ASIS National Office is starting a library of security publications, which we hope in the future will assist a great deal towards supplying you with

needed information. We want to thank Mr. John Jacoppi of Western Electric Company for furnishing us with five sets of the film entitled, "W. E. and Security" which are available to you on loan. This is the start of our collection of security educational films and with company assistance we hope to have more. Your company security manuals would be a great addition to our library and we want to thank Clem St. Pierre of Standard Oil of Indiana and Joe Doherty of Bell Laboratories for furnishing us with their manuals. As ASIS grows, we anticipate doing some research work and your security manuals will be essential for this purpose.

Mr. Ladd and I are working on the Membership Directory and hope to have it to you before too long. The ASIS brochure is presently being printed and will be mailed to you as soon as available.

Recent visitors to the ASIS office have included John Mason, Larry Buchman, Harry Crow, Clarence Bracy, Paul Cooper, Stanley Tracy, John Todd, Thomas Holland, Russ White, Ross Miller, Paul Hansen, Dorothea Quinn, Frank Stanton, Captain Aho and Colonel Arron Bank.

Please keep me advised of any happenings of interest to you or to your chapter. Stop in to see us when in Washington.

VIRGINIA D. EGELSTON

Publication of Amended Industrial Security Manual

The amended Department of Defense Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information was published on March 21, 1958. The changes that have been incorporated in the Manual are summarized in the foreword. Initial distribution is being made by the Military Departments. Organizations requiring additional copies may obtain them from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. The price is 35 cents per copy.

Plan to Revise the Security Requirements Check List (DD Form 254)

The Department of Defense is studying a plan to revise the system now in use that assigns security classifications to various elements of classified contracts. Adoption of the proposed plan would require a revision of the present Security Requirements Check List, DD Form 254.

The plan now being studied is designed to produce a substantial reduction in the quantity of classified information being generated under the existing system. Before the plan is adopted, it will be thoroughly tested in the field on selected contracts.

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Need to Know (Continued)

writing and the transmittal of orders were entrusted to a specialized officer, the Adjutant General, took place later. This refinement resulted in a modification of the military correspondence system.

In 1907 an Army publication was written which pertained to the classification of communications, in addition to limiting the dissemination of classified communication on a "need-to-know" basis. Section II of Army Circular 78, published 21 November 1907, stated: "Hereafter, the word 'Confidential' will not be placed on any communication from the War Department, except where the information is intended for the information of the person to whom addressed. If some military necessity should exist therefor, the contents of such a communication may be made known to others, but the person to whom the communication is addressed must assume all responsibility for such action . . . When the contents of . . . are intended for the information of a certain class or classes of individuals and not for the public at large, it will be marked 'Confidential,' but a statement, printed or written, indicating to whom the contents may be disclosed, will be furnished. Persons receiving such a publication will exercise due care that its contents are not imparted to any unauthorized person. Mimeographs, Bulletins, printed circulars or blue prints marked 'Confidential' which have been issued in the past by the different bureaus of the War Department for distribution to certain officers, are for the use of officers and enlisted men and civilian employees of the United States where necessary in connection with their work." As was the custom in those days, when the circular was made a permanent publication, it became a paragraph (in this case, Number 176) to the Compilation of General Orders.

Congress passed the Espionage Act in 1917, which stated in part that "Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States . . . communicates, delivers . . . either directly or indirectly, any document, writing . . . shall be punished . . ." This Act was included in a temporary Army publication, War Department Bulletin No. 43, in 1917. The provisions of this Bulletin were republished on 14 December 1917 into Paragraph 176 of the General Orders, a more permanent type of Army publication.

In addition to General Orders, another permanent means of Army publication were the Army Regulations which were revised and re-published from time to time. The Army Regulations which had been revised up to 1910 were later amended on 6 June 1912 by adding, in Paragraph 789½ in the section on military correspondence, the first instructions on the protection of the contents of correspondence. These instructions outlined the use of the "Double Envelope System," in which the information to be protected against unauthorized disclosure is placed in a sealed

envelope upon whose face is marked the limitation for dissemination. This marked envelope was then sealed in another envelope which contained its routing but without any indication regarding the classification of the contents. (A modification of this system still exists, and is today required by Section 8 of Executive Order 10501, dated Nov. 5, 1953.) When the Army Regulations were revised in 1913, Paragraph 789½ became Paragraph 778.

On 19 November 1920, Major Sherman Miles, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, reported to his superior, Brigadier General Nolan, Chief, Military Intelligence Division, (and formerly chief intelligence officer of the American Expeditionary Force), the results of a conference regarding the dissemination of classified material which was held on 18 November 1920 with representatives of the War Plans Division and of the Chiefs of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Coast Artillery. As pertains to this study, it is interesting to note the following quotation from Miles' report: "It is understood that military attaches are to be instructed and constantly encouraged to use their stamps (Secret, Confidential, For Official Use Only) in as liberal a sense as possible, so as to allow for as great a dissemination of information as possible. It is further understood that these stamps on information furnished by the Military Intelligence Division shall mean the following: *Secret*: To be sent and returned in double envelope as prescribed; to be kept under lock and key at all times when not actually in use; not to be sent to, or to be shown to any officer outside of the office to which it is sent. (The term office is understood to include such commissioned assistants or boards of officers as may directly pertain to the office); to be returned to the Military Intelligence Division for file as soon as it has been used, unless specifically marked to the contrary. *Confidential*: Not to be shown to, or sent to any officer outside of the office to which it is sent. *For Official Use Only*: Not to be given to any civilian who is not an official of the Government of the United States. Should the Chief of Arms desire to disseminate Confidential or Secret information further than authorized above, he will request authority to do so, in each particular case, of the Military Intelligence Division."

In connection with this report on the results of that conference, Major Miles recommended to General Nolan that, because of differences in interpretation by those individuals present at the meeting, an Army General Order or Regulation be published defining the three classes of information; such definition to be included in the regulations which were being revised by the Army Adjutant General at that time. His recommendation being approved by General Nolan, Major Miles wrote Paragraph 778, Army Regulations, which brought up-to-date and consolidated Paragraph 176, Compilation of Orders and Paragraph

778, Army Regulations. The revised Paragraph 778 was coordinated by Major Miles with pertinent interested Army staff offices, was forwarded to the Chief of Staff for approval, and, in line with the Adjutant General's new system of numbering Army Regulations, on 25 March 1921 it became Army Regulations 330-5.

Since 1921, the wording of the Army Regulations for Safeguarding of Information, as pertains to "need-to-know," has changed only slightly. The Regulations, with the Paragraph on "need-to-know," were amended frequently and changed numerical designations, as follows: AR 330-5, 30 December 1926; paragraph 3, AR 330-5, 12 February 1935; AR 330-5, 11 February 1936; paragraph 18, AR 330-5, 23 September 1937; and AR 330-5, 10 June 1939. Paragraph 3, AR 380-5, 18 June 1941 stated, for example, "No person in the military service or employed by it is entitled to classified military information solely by virtue of his commission or official position. Such information will be entrusted only to those who need it in performance of their official duties and to insure teamwork and efficient instruction of personnel, proper planning, or proper maintenance of equipment;" Paragraphs 3d, 4d, 5d and 50 of AR 380-5, 28 September 1942; Paragraph 11, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944; Paragraph 12, AR 380-5, 6 March 1946; AR 380-5, 15 August 1946; AR 380-5, 15 November 1949;

Paragraph 6b, AR 380-5, 6 June 1952; and Paragraph 40, AR 380-5, 7 December 1954 all pertain to "Need-to-Know."

As evidence that the concept was not confined solely to the Army, both the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Federal Government adopted acts and Orders with language similar to that long used by the military. As noted previously, Section 2, Act of Congress, dated 15 June 1917, stated in part that "Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States . . . communicates, delivers . . . either directly or indirectly, any document, writing . . . shall be punished . . ." This Espionage Act of 1917 is now included in Sections 793 and 794 of Title 18, U. S. Code. The principal difference from the Article of War is the inclusion of the word "intent," which modifies the previous military admonition.

Executive Order 10290, published by the President to take effect 27 October 1951, contained these sentences in Part V: "Paragraph 29a. No person shall be entitled to knowledge or possession of, or access to, classified security information solely by virtue of his office or position. b. Classified security information shall not be discussed with or in the presence of unauthorized persons, and the latter shall not be permitted to inspect or have access to such informa-

(Continued on next page)

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Need to Know (Continued)

tion. Paragraph 30a. The dissemination of classified security information shall be limited to persons whose official duties require knowledge of such information."

Executive Order 10501, effective 5 November 1953, which superseded Executive Order 10290, states in Section 7 that: "Knowledge or possession of classified defense information shall be permitted only to persons whose official duties require such access in the interest of promoting national defense and only if they have been determined to be trustworthy."

In summary then, it is to be noted that the concept to limit the dissemination of military information to those individuals who need it in the performance of their duties is a common sense counter-espionage safeguard which was recognized long ago as extremely important. Over the years, as the soldier's tools became more complicated, and the governmental procedures which ruled the soldier became more complex, the original military concept took on refinements and usage which have tended to obscure its original purpose of safeguarding plans, dispositions, and orders. The two big problems to be solved, if classified information is to receive effective security, are: (1) who shall decide what information is needed by whom, and (2) that the dissemination of such information shall be made only to those individuals who have been determined to be trustworthy. The solution to the first problem was the development of the "need-to-know" policy, which has been applied in the American Army for over a hundred years.

Actually, the second problem may be considered as an extension of the first. Prior to determining an individual's trustworthiness there must be a requirement for such a determination and, basically, that requirement is the individual's need for access to certain information in the performance of his duties. The regulations of the First World War—which established the classification of information into restrictive categories of sensitivity, limited access to that information to those individuals who were trustworthy and discreet. However, it was not until the Second World War that formalized investigative procedures were evolved by which an individual's discretion and trustworthiness could be determined. The scope of the investigation, the amount of confidence placed in an individual's discretion and trustworthiness, and the type of information which an individual requires in the performance of his duties all combine to serve as the means to determine the degree of sensitivity of the information to which an individual is permitted access.

History shows that the "need-to-know" concept has been the basis for determining who may have access to classified information and thus it has played an important part in the protection of our nation's military secrets.

Security and Technology (Continued)

government severe security controls can be exercised. The safeguarding of military information in a democracy has no easy solution. It is at this point that the question is raised of what price security is required to thwart the threat of Soviet espionage in the United States and among the allied nations. The advantage to a foreign government is not confined to a knowledge of political trends and policy on military strategy, plans, and tactics but also in gathering the industrial engineering "know-how" to produce the superior weapon.

Clearly the total efforts involved in developing a modern weapon must be concentrated towards a scientific "break-through." This defense vehicle, when and if required for use in military operations, must be capable to the degree of offensive use to render an enemy force impotent. Each manager and supervisor, scientist and technician, administrator and executive, military and civilian, from the front office to the maintenance shops in research, development, and production, play a part in meeting the requirement.

It has been interesting to note from recent Congressional Committee hearings, comments expressed by world-prominent scientists and leading news media representatives that one of the many factors having a bearing on slowing down our technical progress has been security. This has been subdivided into categories of overclassification, administration of internal security and loyalty-security programs, and insufficient dissemination of sensitive technological information to civilian scientific groups.

It is not intended to refute opinions expressed by the groups mentioned, since it appears to be well recognized that security classification, in addition to the beneficial effect of restricting the information going to the enemy, also tends to increase the costs and time for the application of new ideas. The problem is to achieve the proper balance between the gains and losses, particularly since the application of security classification is the very backbone of the industrial security program when related to the safeguarding of information.

There is a pressing requirement for greater flexibility in the implementation of security practices and procedures in industrial organizations under contract to perform classified work for one of the military departments to produce the advanced weapons needed for defense.

As these strategic, tactical, and defense aspects suggest, versatility and flexibility keynote the military and technological requirements facing us. As a consequence, we must take every practical approach towards research and development of new weapons and delivery systems and in the enhancement of scientific talent in the U. S. and with our allies. Without oversimplifying, as a result of such concentrated and pooled

effort, we must of necessity and mathematically out-gain Soviet technological progress.

This requirement as it pertains to U. S. industry actually breaks down into three separate but inter-related responsibilities: first, to produce reliable, effective equipment; second, to conduct independent, privately-financed research; and third, to carry out an effective, practical security program.

The administration of the latter program has been costing the military departments tens of millions. The responsibility of our military contracting agents and industrial security managers in industry cannot be overemphasized. A progressive downgrading and declassification program is a continuous requirement. Construction of physical barriers within industrial facilities to protect sensitive military equipments is now and must be subject to the prior approval of procurement and contracting representatives. Security clearance costs of contractor employees must be properly evaluated. Careful judgment should be exercised involving such high outlay of funds.

Sound practice and review in these areas can result in inestimable savings which can be used to foster additional research both in Government and private industry.

Basically, an effective security program has two purposes: First, it affords protection to information of vital interest to the welfare of the nation; second,

it assures public relations people and newsmen that timely, noteworthy information will be forthcoming to the American public without harm to national security.

It is understandable that our industries should want to publicize their new products and the contribution they are making to the nation. Concurrently, it is most important that our citizens be fully informed as to the well-being of our defense structure, in terms of new aircraft, guided missiles, radar and communications systems, advanced weapons, nuclear power, and general scientific progress.

It would be ideal if a clear-cut line could be drawn down the middle, plainly separating what can be publicized from that which cannot be. If such were the case, there would be no problem.

But a simple demarcation is not possible, despite the painstaking efforts to categorize classifications by type. Border cases are the rule rather than the exception. An isolated item, for example, may be known about a military project to the point that information pertaining to it appears to require no protection. However, design "know-how," countermeasures and vulnerability, and the function of the item within the framework of a classified system are, in themselves, details over which we should maintain surveillance.

(Continued on next page)



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Security and Technology (Continued)

A soundly-managed industrial security program cannot come about solely as a result of hard and fast regulations laid down by the Department of Defense. The only way for a program to work is for the military, industry, and the public to accept as an integral part of its research, development, and production responsibility, the concurrent requirement for effective security. Among technical groups who are under contract to the military departments, the most liberal approach must be taken in applying the "need-to-know" principle. Basic research data must be given the most widespread dissemination to educational institutions, organizations, and technical societies.

On the other hand, let us eradicate the philosophy that all security impedes technological progress, a conclusion often drawn with regard to security practices. The exceptional advancements made in aircraft, guided missiles, electronics, and all other weapon systems now in production and in military operational activities, and complemented by the vast research and development programs for the future, are indicative of the capability now inherent with American industry. For the truth is that espionage effort overtly and covertly in the U. S. and abroad, now and in the past, is a fact, some percentage lending itself to technological advances by the Soviets.

Technical mastery in the security field should and must be tempered by a sense of judgment and proportion. Only through this procedure can we maintain some reasonable degree of security and still get the job done.

Closed Circuit Television (Continued)

At the close of the conference, the physical security representatives requested that our final plan be submitted in writing before actual installation.

Additional refinements were made by the electronic technicians of our Plant Engineering Department. These were in substituting two-way "squawk" boxes for the open "mikes," and a spare television camera and a monitor to facilitate proper and fast maintenance. The four monitors would be placed in line at eye level of the monitoring guard. They would be located in the general field of vision that was required in the usual performance of his post assignments. A switch would be installed to permit the guard to switch any of the activated monitors to the spare in case of image trouble.

Between the office of the Guard Chief and the Security Office, it was decided to maintain the regular hourly plant patrol through the area by cleared guards. An area code word, changed at intervals, would be used over the "squawk" box by the guard on entering the area. The cleared janitorial personnel would be required to identify themselves over the "squawk" box on entry to the area and stand inspection by the television camera.

The guard at the communications post, on seeing anyone (via the television monitor) enter the closed area, had one of two decisions to make. Should he challenge the person via the "squawk" box system, or should he put out a coded alarm over the plant public address system? His choice would usually be governed by whether he recognized the person or not. If the person was recognized, the guard would challenge the individual. If the guard did not recognize the person, he would use the coded alarm. The coded alarm system would bring the guards on patrol and guards from certain fixed posts, along with the Supervisor, to the closed area. The unknown person would be apprehended.

The plan was written up and presented to the Government contracting officer concerned. A reply was received indicating that the Government interposed no objections to the planned installation for the replacement of a guard post.

The system was then installed, using fixed television cameras to take in only the desired door area. Fixed cameras were used for two reasons. First, rotating cameras were ruled out so as not to pick up a picture of the of the subassemblies, and, further, they would be off the doors for a short period of time. Secondly, from a standpoint of employee relations, fixed cameras were used so that employees would not feel that they were being spied upon. A complete explanation of the use and purpose of the television cameras was given to the area employees concerned. It was further explained that the monitoring screens were not on during the regular area production operations.

Surprise tests were made as to unauthorized area entrances. The coded alarm brought guards to the area within one or two minutes.

The entire installation cost roughly \$11,000.00. This total is broken down approximately as follows:

Cameras (4)	\$ 5,200.00
Monitors (4)	3,600.00
Coaxial Cable (about 1000 feet)	660.00
"Squawk" Boxes (Master and 3)	165.00
Maintenance Instruments	700.00
Conduit	175.00
Labor	500.00
	\$11,000.00

We have paid for the equipment in the saving of the salaries of three guards who would have been required without this equipment. Our Plant Engineering Department advises that the maintenance costs on the system are very reasonable.

Our general military security cognizant agency has expressed interest in the system and has brought it to the attention of some of its other contractors. We at Burroughs Corporation are very satisfied with the system and the overhead cost savings it affords us.

Parallels in History (Continued)

problems in protecting the secrecy of its plans, movements, strength, and resources. The direction of individual loyalties was difficult to determine. Many of General Washington's officers had seen service in the British Army and there are some notorious examples of instances in which loyalty to the Crown eventually prevailed over loyalty to the cause of independence.

Also history indicates that some of Washington's generals did not fully appreciate the requirements necessary to protect the security of the Army's plans and movements.

Even before the Declaration of Independence in July 1776, Washington admonished General Schuyler for granting traveling permits to some British officers allowing them to go to Philadelphia ostensibly on business. Washington appreciated the opportunity thus provided for the British to establish channels of communication with Tories in that area through which intelligence of patriot designs and plans could be obtained.

In spite of Washington's great strength of character, he must have had his faith in his fellow-man dented as a result of his experience with Dr. Benjamin Church. Church graduated from Harvard, class of 1754, and later studied medicine in London. He returned to Boston, where he practiced medicine, apparently successfully. He became active in Whig party circles and later became a member of the provincial congresses. In 1775 he was selected to deliver an appeal from the Massachusetts Congress to the Continental Congress requesting help and guidance in preparing for defense of the colony. The doctor was recommended to Washington as a reliable patriot and a man in whom the Commander-in-Chief might place confidence. Church was made Director-General of the first American Army Hospital at Cambridge.

Washington received complaints about Church's administration of the hospital, from some of the Doctor's colleagues, but an investigation conducted by the Commander-in-Chief resulted in exoneration and commendation.

Church's role as a patriot luminary was to be short-lived, however, for almost upon the heels of the clearance of charges against his conduct in the hospital affair, Church was arrested upon charges of spying. The charges were based upon a letter which Church had written to a Major Cane, one of British General Gage's aides. He was tried before the Massachusetts House of Representatives in October 1775, and subsequently imprisoned at Norwich, Connecticut. The Gage manuscripts, available years later, confirmed the judgment of the Massachusetts House.

The history of the American revolution is replete with other examples of prominent and near-prominent persons who betrayed their trust during the birth of

our nation. One other instance involved the Chaplain of the First Congress, in 1776, the Reverend Jacob Duche. Duche served in this post for a period of only about three months. His resignation followed, by a few days, the British capture of Philadelphia. Shortly after, Washington received a letter from Duche viciously critical of the Congress and Washington's comrades-in-arms. Duche entreated Washington to give up the fight for independence and if he could not influence the Congress to take such a course, that Washington could unilaterally sue for peace. Washington, of course, turned the Duche letter over to Congress. Duche, having revealed himself as a Tory, went to England.

We turn now to a more recent period in our history, a period which even now is seldom discussed in an attitude of complete objectivity.

The Civil War period was a bitter one. It was accompanied by an emotional atmosphere which obscured reason and calm judgment in attempting to distinguish between those loyal to the Union and those sympathetic to the Southern cause. There were many self-appointed arbiters of loyalty. A description of the atmosphere of those times is found in the introduction of a book by Harold M. Hyman, *The Era of the Oath*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954:

"The clergy preached that treason was a sin against the word of God, that traitors were violating his precepts, that Southern sympathizers in the government's service, must be rooted out without mercy. Other groups, lawyers, businessmen, jurists—all lent their voices and pens to the demand for loyalty, unity, and conformity. They wrote letters to editors, pamphlets, and books on this theme. Judges made patriotic ovations of their charges to juries. Politicians kept the subject of loyalty before their constituencies.

Teachers who failed to meet the requirement of patriotism found themselves discharged from college faculties. Private clubs cleansed their membership lists of the names of those who supported the South by word or deed.

Above all else, Northern patriots demanded that the government should be staffed by loyal men. Mass meetings in Kentucky, Maine, New York, and Missouri petitioned Washington to urge exclusion from public office of all who had expressed sympathy."

The Rev. Henry Bellows of New York authored many pamphlets on the subject of loyalty. In one statement, Bellows pointed to the resolutions which dozens of church bodies had passed, urging that the Federal authorities discharge unpatriotic civil servants. "This was no time for scrupulous concern for the innocent few who might suffer as the numerous guilty received their just penalties."

(Continued on next page)

Parallels in History (Continued)

The extensive use of loyalty oaths in the past few years, by both Federal and State jurisdictions, has been a subject of widespread discussion and controversy. Here again has history furnished a prologue. In 1861, Lincoln's Attorney-General, Edward Bates, proposed to the Cabinet that ". . . all the employees of the Department—from the head Secretary to the lowest messenger, be required to take, anew, The Oath of Allegiance."¹ The Cabinet agreed. Thus the loyalty tests of the Civil War began. Civil servants in Federal offices across the country reaffirmed their allegiance by taking an oath of intent to "support the Constitution of the United States." This was the only statutory loyalty requirement which existed when Congress convened in July 1861.

The use of loyalty tests spread rapidly in the early months of the Civil War and continued to affect the lives of citizens on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line on through the Reconstruction period.

The States took up the loyalty test also. "In Missouri, civilians inside federal lines had to swear fidelity to the Union to prevent confiscation of property, to escape imprisonment, or as Samuel Clemens learned, to be a steamboat pilot."²

The application of the loyalty test was carried to greater extremes, perhaps, in Missouri, Louisiana, and Tennessee. Kentucky, however, was a close runner-up.

In Kentucky, anyone who aided the Confederacy had to report to Federal military posts and swear future loyalty to the Union—the alternative was imprisonment. Northern officers in the divided border state jailed many nonjurors, and deported many more into Southern lines. A Kentuckian could hardly pass a day without taking one or more oaths. In order to buy food at a commercial store the Union oath was required; only those with oath receipts could secure the passes needed for traveling and sending mail. Here, as in other places, military authorities altered the form of the oaths as they saw fit. During the first two years of the war, Kentuckians usually found themselves faced with the civil servants' oath of August 1861. Often, Union officers added an extra clause: "Death or other punishment by the judgment of a Military Commission will be the penalty for the violation of this . . . solemn oath." It required Lincoln's direct intercession before Union officers would permit his Kentucky sister-in-law to begin her trip to Washington without subscription to the oath.³

Missouri was kept in the Union, but Missouri politics were bitterly partisan during and after the war. A State constitutional convention of 1862 specified

an oath of past loyalty to state and nation for all office holders.⁴ When Halleck took command of Federal forces in Missouri, he determined to use the State constitutional convention's oath as the standard of loyalty. Those who refused to take the oath were to lose the privileges of citizenship, be barred from voting, practicing medicine or law, teaching in public or private schools, acting as jurors or witnesses, or traveling on public roads. Halleck arrested all State officials who refused the oath.

Conflict between the legislative and executive branches of our Federal Government over the purging of alleged disloyal employees from Government agencies is also a historical problem. Lincoln's administration had an experience with a committee of the House of Representatives somewhat similar to that which another Republican president some 90 years later was to have with a committee also led by a member of his own party.

Republican Congressman John F. Potter of Wisconsin introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives, in 1861, proposing the creation of a committee of five members. The House approved the resolution and the committee was organized, with Potter as Chairman, "to ascertain the number of persons . . . now employed in the several Departments of the Government . . . and who have refused to take the oath to support the Government."⁵

Within a few weeks after the investigation had begun, Potter promised "surprising revelations" concerning the extent of disloyalty among civil servants. He criticized Government officials who retained disloyal personnel in their departments and expressed himself as being "astonished at the number of well-authenticated cases of disloyalty to the government."⁶

The committee met almost daily after its creation. One of its first moves was to request from every department head the names of employees who had not taken the required oaths of office. (This included a new oath prescribed by a law passed in August 1861, requiring affirmation of future loyalty to the Constitution, the Government, and fidelity to the Union.) Between July and October, 1861, the Potter group investigated more than 550 disloyalty charges; heard more than 450 witnesses.⁷

The committee protected the anonymity of informers. As a matter of fact, most subjects of disloyalty complaints knew nothing of the charges against them, and, of course, had no opportunity to defend themselves before the committee. The employee usually first learned of the accusation when some action was taken against him by his employer. "Action" might

¹*The Era of the Oath*, Harold M. Hyman, Univ. of Penn. Press, 1954, p. 1

²*Ibid.*, p. 13

³*Ibid.*, p. 37

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 37

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 1

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 1

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 3

be immediate dismissal, a request for resignation, or opportunity to answer charges.

The procedures followed by the Potter committee met some opposition. Representatives Olin of New York and Wickliffe of Kentucky sponsored a resolution, in December 1861, giving to those accused of disloyalty by Potter's Committee the right to appear before that group and defend their Unionism. Wickliffe charged that the Potter Committee was destroying the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive. The executive Secretaries, Wickliffe insisted, had the sole right to set policies for their employees.⁸

After Potter's group examined allegations of civil servants' disloyalty, it drew up two lists of names. The first contained the roster of Government employees concerning whose disloyalty the Potter investigators had no doubts. The second list was of those against whom the evidence "... furnished a well-grounded suspicion of disloyalty." These listings went to every executive department, and were followed by supplemental lists as Potter completed more investigations. At this point, the formal authority of the committee ended. It was up to the department head to take action. But Potter had informal means avail-

able to enforce his conclusions concerning allegedly disloyal employees. By publishing his findings, especially in official reports and newspapers, Potter exerted pressure on executive officials to conform to his committee's conclusions.

Some of the executive Secretaries disagreed with Potter's all-inclusive concept of the functions of his committee. The War and Navy Secretaries refused to consider the claims which Potter advanced concerning the alleged disloyalty of military and naval officers. Potter included such names, however, in his published report on disloyal persons in the Government's service.

Potter sent to the War Department the names of 57 allegedly disloyal employees. By January 1862, 20 of that number had left the Government service, either through discharge or resignation. The Secretary of War refused to consider the charges against about 20 of the remainder, who were military officers and civilian contractors. In addition to the names which Potter supplied, the War Department discharged an indefinite number of other employees, without specifying the reasons.

In summary, Potter found 320 persons he presumed were disloyal in all the Federal departments. Of the 500 cases he investigated, 90 were no longer in Gov-

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Ibid., p. 3


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
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Parallels in History (Continued)



ernment employ by January 1862. These figures indicate that Potter's loyalty-investigating committee did unearth a substantial number of cases wherein the firing or resignation of those he accused gave some color to his accusations.⁹

Literature in this field examined by the writer has

⁹Ibid, p. 7

Administration of Security (Con't)
ranks through our employees. It is also evidence that the details of American defense are as coveted today as they were in war time. To counter such efforts we have pledged ourselves to make sure no compromise is ours.

Security responsibility at Western Electric is accepted at the "grass root" level and thus is a deterrent to espionage agents. Potentially, their best source of information is through the individual employee, which includes all of us. This does not imply deliberate intent by an employee to collaborate with an espionage agent, but rather by carelessness or thoughtlessness which can be equally damaging.

It is apparent in the light of present world tensions that the industrial security program will be of extended duration. A long range program has thus been established to instill security consciousness in individuals at all Company locations. The program involves standardized training material for use by local security supervisors at the

more than one hundred locations all over the country. It consists of classroom and other training media such as posters, security bulletins, filmstrips, and similar items. To serve as a reference and ready handbook, we have published a Security Guide and a Secretaries Security Digest which are easy to read and are used as supplements to our Standard Divisional Security Instructions.

Although the program is controlled administratively by our staff organization in New York, it is conceived to be dependent for successful translation into action by three broadly defined groups: local supervision, operating personnel, and security representatives. It is regarded as a teamwork operation among these groups. Program material must constantly be developed and kept up to date by our staff group.

The indoctrination program itself is divided into three phases as enumerated below:

Phase I—Primary orientation deals with the employee newly as-

signed to classified work, and provides a fundamental understanding of the reason and purpose of security, and dispels any incorrect or cloudy ideas held on the subject. It takes place prior to a work assignment and involves less than thirty minutes.

Although no effort is made during the interview to instruct the individual in the mechanics of security, areas considered important to discuss with the uninitiated are:

- (1) Company obligations as set forth in the Company Security Agreement negotiated with the Department of Defense.
- (2) Basic principles of American citizenship and their moral obligations.
- (3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information which violates Department of Defense regulations and the company security agreement; also, penalties provided for such cases under the provisions of the applicable Federal statutes.
- (4) Instruction by their supervisors regarding specific securi-

ty assignments and responsibilities.

Security representatives conducting orientation interviews encourage questions by new employees, and a definite effort is made to convince them of the importance of their individual responsibilities for properly safeguarding classified material.

At the close of each orientation interview, a copy of the Company Security Guide or Security Digest for Secretaries is furnished. Prior to the next phase of training, the supervisor is responsible for guiding his employee's security operations. This may be a trying period for the supervisor. In charting the security course of the new employee, he may encounter formidable obstacles in ordinary human frailty. Therefore, the supervisor must be persistent in aiding the new employee to expand his knowledge of security requirements. A dependable employee with alert security consciousness is the objective.

Phase II—Primary indoctrination consists of training for employees who have previously received primary orientation. It is actually a planned follow-up to orientation and is given within two months after the orientation session. Employees are given opportunity during the meeting to ask questions on any procedure that may not be crystal clear.

Present indoctrination methods are geared to the concept that employees must be told the WHY as well as the HOW of security. It is accomplished largely through the medium of a 235 frame 35mm filmstrip titled "W. E. and Security." Narration for the film is recorded on tape and both are synchronized by means of a written copy of the narrative text, a training aid referred to as a "visual industrial security manual." Motivational themes and illustrations are used to enhance its effectiveness, since reasons are more compelling when illustrations are given to support

them. Illustrations used are necessarily factual.

During a recent meeting composed of industry and Department of Defense representatives, our visual aid was demonstrated for evaluation purposes prior to its general use in our training program. Subsequent remarks indicated that the filmstrip was appreciated as having high value for use as a training adjunct.

Copies of our filmstrip have been furnished to the American Society for Industrial Security in Washington for loan purposes to industry members and the military. It is regarded as common denominator material which can be used as prepared or changed by any user to meet their particular security requirements.

Phase III—Security refresher meetings are held every six months for all employees having experienced phases I and II of the indoctrination.

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
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"Masters of Deceit"

By J. EDGAR HOOVER



On March 10, 1958, Henry Holt and Company published a new book on communism entitled "Masters of Deceit" by J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In this book Mr. Hoover deals with all facets of communism. After a historical introduction, the author discusses in detail the organization and operation of the Communist Party, USA.

The reader is taken "behind the scenes" and shown how a Party club functions, how the Party leaders live, how a Party paper operates, how the Party sells literature, how communist discipline is maintained. Special chapters discuss why people join and leave the Party.

A large section of the book is devoted to the communist attack against noncommunist institutions. Mr. Hoover describes the communist tactics of mass agitation, infiltration and front organizations. In this connection he makes suggestions on how best to combat the communist menace. He points out that the American people must be constantly alert—that the security of the Nation is the responsibility of every patriotic citizen.

The Party's "illegal" nature is described in chapters on the Party's underground apparatus and the Party's relation to Soviet espionage. He tells of Soviet Russia's interest in spying—in securing as much information as possible about our industries, defense facilities, and military equipment. Our very best efforts must be pitted against this danger.

In a chapter on religion, Mr. Hoover shows the atheistic nature of communism and its effort to infiltrate churches in America.

The book is completed by an extensive glossary of communist terms, a bibliography, a table of dates, and an index.

Administration of Security (Con't)

trination program. This is considered the proper time to bring everything that has gone before into focus in view of our continuing security responsibilities. Visual aids are modified to meet the needs of more experienced personnel. Presentations must be revised in successive refresher meetings to

stimulate and maintain interest in security matters.

Aside from the visual aids employed in the above program, it is essential to provide adequate, enthusiastic leadership for each meeting. In addition, the mechanics of security must be divested of any mystery or any implications that they can be understood only by experienced security personnel.

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL NAMED DEPUTY CinC, USAFE



Major General Joseph F. Carroll, Deputy Inspector General for Security, Headquarters, United States Air Force, has been ordered to Europe where he will assume the important duties of Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe. His new assignment begins on April 1, 1958. General Carroll is an Honorary Member of the American Society for Industrial Security. This honor was bestowed upon him in February 1957 because of the great contribution he has made to the security of the Nation.

General Carroll was born in Chicago, Illinois on March 19, 1910. He received his A. B. Degree at St. Mary's, Mundelein, Ill., and his J. D. from Loyola University in Chicago. He served with the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1940 to 1945. In that period he rose from Special Agent to Inspector. From August 1945 to April 1947, he was on loan from the FBI to the Surplus Property Administration and the War Assets Administration where he served as Director, Compliance Enforcement Division. In 1947 General Carroll was made Director of the Office of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, U. S. Air Force. In 1950 he was promoted to Deputy Inspector General for Security.

General and Mrs. Carroll have 5 sons: Joseph F., Jr., 17; James M., 15; Brian P., 12; Dennis T., 9; and Kevin M., 6. His family will accompany him to Europe.

General Carroll's new address will be: United States Air Forces in Europe, A.P.O. 633, New York, New York.

His many friends in ASIS wish him good luck in his new assignment.

The orientation, indoctrination, and refresher phases of our training program possess a flexibility which will allow adaptation to changes made in Department of Defense or company requirements. This, together with an effective survey system and progressive employee indoctrination and training methods, assures a continuous adherence to security regulations.

A Film— (Continued)

proach, or perhaps were based on instructions in the mechanics of how to lock safes, mark classified material or like subjects. We decided immediately that any movie produced should not be based on such overdone themes but should have a fresh approach in keeping with the entire company security program. In addition, it was felt the movie must be striking and attention-getting to compete with the basic interest of the scientist.

In the search for a fresh approach, two specifications were laid down during discussions with public relations writers and the motion picture staff: the film would be in color, would be short (about 10 minutes), and would limit its message to justifying and reinforcing the company security slogan, "Security Is Your Responsibility."

The decision was made to try for a light, humorous touch, and to show a pleasant and capable young scientist as initially not-quite-bright in the security department. Understandably, there were objections to the use of humor in treating so vital a subject as security. The young scientist object-lesson had to be drawn with care, since if his characterization were taken as uncomplimentary to the Ramo-Wooldridge technical staff, the picture would necessarily fail. After

much discussion, a skeptical approval was granted the plan, and work began on the script.

The first script needed some editing and went back to the writers. What we considered a suitable script followed and the next step was to ask a number of the scientists on the staff to review the script and get their reactions. Surprising to those who worked on the project was the almost unanimous favorable comment received.

Actual shooting of the film followed shortly thereafter, and in many respects seemed comparatively easy as opposed to the original "idea" and script stages.

The movie was shot over a period of four weeks at our R-W facilities near Los Angeles International Airport.

After editing, we ended up with a 7½ minute film.


Into the projection room we went for a "preview" showing—

As it opened, we saw the soles of a pair of shoes filling the screen. They were worn by, and resting on the littered desk of, Harry Bumble, fictional young engineer, whom we watched for a few moments at work.

Harry's "profile" was established by a series of

(Continued on next page)

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A Film— (Continued)

shots in which the real Harry posed with stylized cartoon backgrounds showing his family, his education, and his service life, with a narrator off-camera.

As we returned to Harry's office, the narrator spoke sharply to him, and much of their discussion of the security problem was illustrated by cutting to symbolic shots. Harry was convinced that he wasn't a security problem because "the secretaries do all that," or "after all, that's why we have security officers in uniform." But Harry's file cabinet gaped open, and among the litter on his desk turned up a document or two showing a "SECRET" stamp.

The need for individual alertness and caution was pointed up by the narrator as we were shown a busy hallway at The Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation with secretaries crossing the corridor and engineers passing in and out of the offices. Accompanying each person, even the mail girl, was a uniformed security officer. The scene shifted to a super market in which each shopper had his or her security officer patiently waiting at the cart.

By the end of the film, the narrator had made his point with Harry, the desk was cleared of all but innocuous materials, and Harry was properly arranging the lock bar on his file cabinet at the fadeout.

Next we tried the film out on other groups.

The picture was first shown to selected audiences, including the management of the company and government security representatives. It was enthusiastically received, and we felt gratified.

The film is now shown to all new R-W employees as part of their initial security indoctrination, and all agree that it is instructive and makes its point in an interesting way.

Soon after it was completed, the film was seen by an instructor from the Department of Defense Industrial Security School at Fort Holabird, Md. He liked it so well that he asked for a copy to be shown as a part of the course at the school. At Fort Holabird the film was shown to the many security representatives from government and industry attending the school. Inquiries from all parts of the country followed, and so much interest was shown in the film that we decided to make additional prints to lend to interested organizations. Then came requests to purchase prints. The Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation copyrighted the film, and will supply it at cost to purchasers who agree not to alter it.

Twenty-five copies of the film have been out on loan for most of the last year, and to date 16 companies have purchased 24 copies.

Naturally, we feel that the time involved in the production of "Security Is Your Responsibility" was well spent and we are firmly convinced that motion pictures are of real value to the security education program at Ramo-Wooldridge.

"Selling" Security (Continued)

picted leaning over people's shoulders, eavesdropping on conversations and ransacking desks and filing cabinets which were left unlocked. The characterization was subsequently carried through on our posters, which are appearing at two-week intervals throughout our plants.

The lecture-presentations were immediately followed up by the continuing poster campaign. Blotters, scratch pads, stickers and other printed material with security messages are continuously being distributed to all personnel.

A company-authored guide book was prepared and distributed which covered the highlights of security requirements, and did so in simple, down-to-earth language.

The program has further been supplemented by periodic articles regarding security in our company publications and, also, by a security newsletter which is distributed frequently.

In all of our material, we have used the positive approach in our attempt to "sell" security, rather than cram it down people's throats. We tell them as frequently as possible what to do and why they should do it, but, infrequently, what not to do.


We have tried to take our whole campaign out of the "don't-do-this-or-else" category. We have stressed that security sense is common sense, and to exemplify this have utilized a common-sense analogy. We tell our employees to think of a classified document as if it were money and to treat it accordingly. For example, when they are not using it, lock it up; when they mail it, register it; and when they transfer it, get a receipt.

The success to date of our campaign has justified our approach. It is quite difficult to weigh the specific effectiveness of such an "awareness program;" however, a new alertness to security has been quite evident throughout all of our defense project facilities.

"Selling" security is not an easy job, nor a one-shot proposition. It must be continuously sold—and sold effectively. Our program is designed to continue for an indefinite time with posters, lectures, films, articles and reminders. The fundamental rules of good selling practices apply, and our responsibility is to keep our "product" in front of our "customers." Although "priceless," freedom can be bought—not with dollars and cents, but with alertness, knowledge and willingness.

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